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The pickle receiver is vulnerable to injection of arbitrarily pickled objects

Bug #817247 reported by Dave Rawks
258
This bug affects 1 person
Affects Status Importance Assigned to Milestone
Graphite
Fix Committed
Undecided
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Bug Description

The picklereceiver should require some sort of authentication to ensure that only trusted receivers can send pickle objects AND/OR the deserialization of pickle objects should be somehow sanitized to prevent arbitrary class objects from being called.

example:
http://penturalabs.wordpress.com/2011/03/17/python-cpickle-allows-for-arbitrary-code-execution/

Revision history for this message
chrismd (chrismd) wrote :

I've added a new USE_INSECURE_UNPICKLER option to carbon.conf, it defaults to False, so the default implementation now is basically the implementation from http://nadiana.com/python-pickle-insecure

I left the insecure version as an option because it is faster. Also note that not using the insecure unpickler does not imply that the unpickler you get is secure! There are various vulnerabilities in the pickle protocol beyond just calling os.system.

If you install 0.9.9 and see a performance regression you might consider explicitly setting USE_INSECURE_UNPICKLER = True.

Changed in graphite:
status: New → Fix Committed
Michael Leinartas (mleinartas)
information type: Private Security → Public Security
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